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Abstract 
Many jurisdictions use criminal informants –suspects or defendants who provide 
evidence in return to a charge or a sentence benefit– to investigate and prosecute 
mainly organized crimes. Ethiopia has also embraced this investigation and 
prosecution tool with respect to some selected crimes. This article examines and 
explicates the legal framework on criminal informant in the context of four 
proclamations governing corruption, terrorism, trafficking and smuggling in 
persons, and witness and whistle blowers protection. I argue that the law suffers 
considerable limitations and gaps in articulating complete, clear and coherent 
standards for informant selection, and consistent concessions and benefits, as well 
as in terms of instituting adequate guarantees and meaningful enforcement 
mechanisms to protect defendants against the blemishes of the informant system. 
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Introduction 
Jurisdictions employ various investigative techniques including use of 
informants, physical and/or electronic surveillance, informant protection 
schemes and undercover agents to fight crimes and criminals, notably organized 
crimes.1 This article deals with criminal informants who provide evidence 
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1 Thomas Gobar et al (2010), Community Effects of Law Enforcement Countermeasures 
against Organized Crime: A retrospective Analysis, Report No 006, available at: 
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca>, p. 4. (Accessed on 25 Feb 2018)  
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against co-defendants/participants in exchange for some concessions: sentence 
and/or charge reduction or total exemption from criminal liability, often known 
as immunity. 
Many jurisdictions use criminal informants as a tool of investigation and 
garnering relevant evidence in a criminal participation so that criminals face 
justice.2 Criminal informants are also applied to thwart crimes.3 Conventionally, 
criminal informants are employed in organized crimes to investigate and 
prosecute those suspects up in the ladder of a criminal activity who normally 
operate through intermediaries.4 International Conventions recognize and 
encourage states to use criminal informants in the investigation and prosecution 
of transnational organized crimes and crimes of corruption.5 The major rationale 
for criminal informant use in organized crimes rests mainly on the assumption 
that “the most culpable and dangerous criminals rarely do the ‘dirty job’… ”; 
instead they often  control and guide others to do it.6 Thus, allowing “low-tier 
criminals to flip and turn informants seems to be a potentially key channel to 
fight organized crimes”.7 
In Ethiopia, criminal informant use has found its place mainly through four 
proclamations: the Anti-Corruption Proclamation8, Anti-terrorism Proclamation9, 
Anti- trafficking and smuggling Proclamation10 and Witness and whistleblowers 
                                           
2 This applies for example in such jurisdictions as diverse as Italy, Germany, USA, 
Netherlands and UK at varying degrees. See Nicholas Fyfe and James Sheptycki (2006), 
‘International Trends in the Facilitation of Witness Cooperation in Organized Crimes’, 
European Journal of Criminology Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 336-38. 
3 Peter J. Tak (1997), ‘Deals with Criminals: Supergrasses, Crown Witnesses and Pentiti’, 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol.5, No.2, p. 18. 
4 Antonio Acconcia, et al (2014), ‘Accomplice Testimony and Organized crimes: Theory 
and Evidence from Italy’, Scand. J. of Economics, Vol.116, No. 4, pp. 1116–1159. 
5 See Article 37 of UN Convention Against Corruption and Article 26 of UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crimes; where both instruments recognize the use of 
sentence mitigation or immunity in exchange of the criminal informants assistance in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes in question. See also Article 5(5) of AU 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption where although not so explicit on 
rewarding informants, States parties undertake the obligation to “adopt legislative and 
other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption cases…” which could 
include exemption from criminal prosecution. 
6 Antonio Acconcia, et al (2014), supra note 4, p.1117. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Article 43(1), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
Proclamation No. 434/2005. 
9 Article 33, The Anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. 
10 Article 23, The Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of 
Migrants Proclamation No 909/2015. 
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protection Proclamation.11 It is also recognized under the newly adopted FDRE 
Criminal Justice Policy. The Policy explicitly allows the use of criminal 
informant testimony in ‘organized crimes’, corruption, terrorism, and complex 
crimes.12 The above legal and policy frameworks for informant use have 
remained unexplored. Very little is known or no research has been conducted on 
how informant use is regulated under Ethiopian law, notably the legal 
framework on the standards to select criminal informants, the nature of 
concessions and benefits involved, enforcement mechanisms, and the safeguards 
put in place for defendants. This article investigates the extent to which the legal 
framework fares in regulating criminal informant use. To this end, it analyses 
laws, policy documents, and relevant literature on the subject matter. 
The first section of this article sets out the scene by briefly discussing the 
meaning and nature of criminal informants. The second section outlines the 
rationales of criminal informants use in the Ethiopian setting. The third section 
examines the laws governing criminal informant use followed by the final 
section that forwards concluding remarks.  
1. Meaning and Nature of Criminal Informants  
Criminal informants are suspects or defendants who provide information or 
evidence in exchange for an inducement or benefit.13 This may include 
accomplices, co-defendants, and co-conspirators who seek cooperation deals 
with prosecutors in order to reduce or avoid their criminal exposure.14 They are 
distinguished from law-abiding persons who supply information to law 
enforcement organs and often regarded as source of information: victims, 
whistle-blowers, citizens, investigators etc. The form of assistance criminal 
informants deliver to the system could range from providing information that 
enables investigation to testifying against fellow co-offenders. Hence, they are 
sometimes called cooperating witnesses, informant witnesses or incentivized 
witnesses. The benefits criminal informants procure span from simple financial 
gains to sentence or charge concessions or total exemption from prosecution.15 
Although criminal informants may take a variety of forms, this article 
focuses on criminal informants who supply information/evidence in relation to a 
                                           
11 Article 3, Protection of Witnesses and Whistle-blowers of Criminal Offences 
Proclamation No.699/2010. 
12 See FDRE (2011), The Criminal Justice Policy of Ethiopia, pp. 22-23. 
13 Alexandra Natapoff (2009), Snitching: Criminal Informants and the Erosion of American 
Justice (New York University press), p.177. 
14 Russell D. Covey (2014), ‘Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony’, Wake Forest L. Rev. 
Vol.49, p. 1375.  
15 Alexandra Natapoff (2004), ‘Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences’, 
Legal studies paper No. 2004-24, p. 652. 
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past crime they participated i.e., co-participants after the fact. Thus, it does not 
cover active criminal informants, i.e., it does not include the most controversial 
arrangement made with undercover agents or confidential informants, who 
infiltrate a crime and are often active in the commission of a crime. Nor does it 
cover jailhouse informants, who often claim to have received incriminating 
information or confession from a suspect or a defendant while incarcerated 
together. 
2. The Rationale for Criminal Informant Use in Ethiopia  
This section attempts to explore and examine the rationales advanced in favour 
of criminal informant use in the Ethiopian criminal justice system. Thus, the 
point of departure would be the criminal justice policy; then the respective laws 
that embrace criminal informants are consulted. 
2.1 A matter of necessity  
The need to investigate and prosecute organized crimes, which are mainly 
beyond ordinary means of investigation, is among the major rationales for 
jurisdictions to have recourse to criminal informant use.16 Ethiopian policy 
makers also subscribe to this rationale. With a view to combat and prosecute 
serious and complex crimes, the criminal justice policy embraces special 
investigative techniques such as, criminal informant use, physical and/or 
electronic surveillance, informant protection schemes, and undercover agents.17 
The underlying assumption behind such special investigative tools rests on the 
fact that ordinary means of investigation are not effective in detecting, 
investigating and prosecuting the crimes under consideration. It is often 
suggested that the veil of secrecy and the intermediary features of organized 
crimes necessitate such extraordinary techniques of investigation.18 Inducing 
criminal informants with lenient treatments in terms of charge or sentence or 
with immunity has been found necessary to detect and effectively prosecute 
such crimes. However, the policy seems to expand the use of criminal 
informants beyond organized crimes and includes complex and serious crimes 
provided that the ordinary means of investigation is unable to solve such 
crimes.19 
The necessity rationale is also used to validate the use of criminal informants 
in the prosecution of crimes of trafficking and smuggling in persons in Ethiopia. 
                                           
16 R. Michael Cassidy (2004), “‘Soft Words of Hope': Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and 
the Problem of Implied Inducements”, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 98, p. 
1137; Alexandra Natapoff (2009), supra note 13, p 30. 
17 See The ECJ Policy, supra note 12, section 3.17, p 20. 
18 R. Michael Cassidy (2004) supra note 16; Alexandra Natapoff (2009), supra note 13. 
19 See The ECJ Policy, supra note 12, section 3.17.5 (a & b), p. 22. 
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The drafters of this law take the unavailability of evidence as a rationale to 
resort to criminal informant use–as a matter of necessity.20 Likewise, in practice, 
prosecutors point to the impossibility of obtaining evidence (in particular that of 
witnesses) as one major reason to vindicate informant use.21 Thus, instead of 
‘risking no punishment at all’ on all criminal participants, it is better to punish 
more culpable defendants or impose some of the punishment offenders deserve 
by flipping less culpable ones. This goes to the notion of utilitarian calculus of 
costs and benefits that can be captured by the famous adage: Half a loaf is better 
than none.  J. Bentham once noted: 
… so long as there is other means of obtaining the conviction of a criminal 
without thus rewarding an accomplice, this method is bad; the impunity 
necessarily accompanying it is an evil. But if there be no other means, this 
method is good; since the immunity of a single criminal is a less evil than the 
impunity of many. 22  
It should be noted that the instrumentality of criminal informants is not 
something uncontested. There are concerns that the use of informant testimony, 
by tolerating and at times by generating some crimes, could be 
counterproductive in the fight against crimes.23 It has also the potential to reduce 
the deterrent effect of punishment.24 
2.2 Efficiency  
Although it is nowhere explicitly mentioned as a justification for informant use 
in Ethiopia, it is generally acknowledged that criminal informants deliver 
efficiency benefits to any justice system by making investigation and 
prosecution activities easier and cheaper.25 It spares time and resources which 
otherwise would be consumed in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
Thus, the rationale focuses on the saving of time and resources regardless of 
whether informant use is a matter of necessity. Thus, so long as the use of 
criminal informants delivers efficiency, it may displace ordinary means of 
investigation that are capable of unveiling the crime. Indeed, Ethiopian justice 
actors point to this rationale while employing criminal informants even in the 
                                           
20 Explanatory Note on the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling in Persons Proclamation, on file 
with the author (contains no page). 
21 Alemu Meheretu (2018), Exploring Criminal Informant Use in Ethiopia: Some 
Experiences from the Federal Government and Selected Oromia Zones, (unpublished), 
p.18. 
22 J. Bentham (1968), The Rational of Rewards in Works, edited by J. Bowring, Vol. 2, p. 
223. 
23 Alexandra Natapoff (2004), supra note 15, p. 661. 
24 Miriam Hechler Baer (2011), ‘Cooperation's Cost’, Wash. U. L. Rev. Vol. 88, p 903. 
25 Alexandra Natapoff (2009), supra note 13, p. 31; David Leimbach (2009), ‘Minimizing 
the Risk of Injustice in cooperation Agreements’, Dartmouth L.J, Vol.7, p.176. 
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absence of any law authorizing them to do so.26 Surely, some invoke the 
Cassation ruling in Yordanos Abay vs. Public Prosecutor27, which sanctions the 
use of criminal informants reasoning that no law prohibits such use. In so doing 
they attempt to paint the practice some sort of formality, the propriety of which 
shall be discussed later. 
While it is true that criminal informant use enhances the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the criminal justice process, it is laden with considerable risks 
and compromises of other sacred values of the justice system, namely accuracy 
and fairness. Researches document that the informant system is compounded 
with host of adverse effects including perjury and wrongful convictions28, 
corruption and abuses29, discrimination against similarly situated defendants30, 
and impunity.31 Most of these concerns do not seem to be jurisdiction specific, 
and are thus valid for Ethiopia too. What is less certain would be the extent to 





                                           
26 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, p.18. 
27 Yordanos Abay vs. Public Prosecutor, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Decision, Vol. 
12, File No.57988, Tir 10, 2003, p. 196. 
28 Brandon L. Garrett (2008), ‘Judging Innocence’, Colum. L. Rev. Vol.108, pp. 76, 87–88 
(noting that out of 200 DNA exonerations 18 percent are caused by false informant 
testimony); S. Greer, ‘Where the Grass is Greener? Super grasses in Comparative 
Perspective’, in R. Billingsley, et al (2001) (eds) Informers, Policing, Policy and Practice. 
(Devon: Willan Publishing); Bennett L. Gershman (2002), ‘Witness Coaching by 
Prosecutors’, Cardozo L. Rev. Vol. 23, pp., 852-53; R. Michael Cassidy (2004), supra 
note 16, p.1130. ; Nicholas Fyfe and James Sheptycki (2006) supra note 2, p.34. 
29 R. Michael Cassidy (2004), supra note 16, p.1130; Alexander J. Menza (1999), ‘Witness 
Immunity: Unconstitutional, Unfair, Unconscionable’, Seton Hall Const. L.J. Vol.9, 
p.532; Alexandra Natapoff (2004), supra note 15, p 663. 
30 Stephen J. Schulhofer (1993), ‘Rethinking Mandatory Minimums’, Wake Forest L. Rev. 
Vol. 28, pp. 211-12 (criticizing cooperation for causing paradoxical disproportionalities in 
sentences); Alexandra Natapoff (2004), supra note 15, p.664; Alexander J. Menza (1999), 
supra note 29, p 531. (Arguing that granting witness immunity in exchange of testimony 
results in unequal enforcement of the laws). 
31 Daniel C. Richman (1996), ‘Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of 
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels’, Fed. Sent‘g Rep. Vol.8, p.293; Alexandra 
Natapoff (2009), supra note 13, p.38; Nicholas Fyfe and James Sheptycki (2006), supra 
note 2, p.347. 
32 For a review of the challenges from the Ethiopian context, see Alemu Meheretu, ‘The 
Challenges of Using Criminal Informant Testimony in Ethiopia’, Journal of Ethiopian 
Law, Forthcoming. 
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3. The Legal Framework on Criminal Informants 
The use of criminal informants, which permeates any crime in practice33, is 
largely unregulated in Ethiopia. The exception could be crimes of corruption, 
trafficking and smuggling in persons and terrorism where its application is 
formally sanctioned in general terms. Yet, there are no detailed procedures 
governing it. Although the use of criminal informant remains –for the most 
part– unregulated,34 some argue that the Federal Cassation Division in Yordanos 
Abay vs. Public Prosecutor case35 sanctions it; and indeed prosecutors often 
successfully invoke this case as an authority.  
The authority of this case, which upholds the switching of an accused involved 
in a crime of theft into a witness against another co-accused, in return to a 
concession (dropping of charges) is problematic. To start with, by holding that 
no law prohibits the prosecution from turning suspects –against whom criminal 
investigation has been completed– into a witness, the court erroneously 
displaces a clear law that proscribes any inducement against suspects.36 Criminal 
informant selection involves inducing a suspect with an offer of immunity at the 
investigative stage or later on the basis of his statement given at the police 
station.37 Further, by articulating no standard that can guide informant use, the 
court leaves the gate wide open so much so that defendants are turned into 
witnesses at the last minute of the trial including after the prosecution witnesses 
are heard, which is not uncommon in practice.38 
Leaving the discussion on the dynamics of the practice for another work 
(which is worth a separate discussion), this article deals with the sufficiency or 
otherwise of the legal framework on criminal informant focusing on the 
regulation of standards for selection, the concessions and benefits involved, 
enforcement mechanisms, and the safeguards put in place for defendants. To 
some extent, resort will be made to the practice so as to support the legal 
analysis.  
3.1 The FDRE Criminal Justice Policy  
The 2011 FDRE Criminal Justice Policy embraces criminal informant use as 
one policy option to combat complex and serious crimes including organized 
                                           
33 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, p. 49. 
34 Id., p. 49 and Alemu Meheretu, supra note 32. 
35 Yordanos Abay vs. Public Prosecutor, supra note 27. 
36 Article 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads: “No police officer or person in authority 
shall offer or use or make or cause to be offered, made or used any inducement, threat, 
promise or any other improper method to any person examined by the police.” 
37 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, section 4.1. 
38 Ibid; see also Alemu Meheretu, supra note 32. 
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crimes, crimes involving use of firearms and terrorism.39 Although the Policy 
lists the above crimes, it seems to validate criminal informant use in complex 
and serious crimes on the condition that the cooperation of the informant must 
be so essential that effective investigation or prosecution is impossible or 
becomes taxing without it.40 The merit of this expansive approach on informant 
use –which is apparent both from the range of crimes the phrase ‘serious and 
complex crimes’– covers and the second limb of the qualification i.e., ‘… 
becomes taxing’, is open to debate. This would leave the gate wide open to the 
detriment of thorough and effective investigation for it may encourage laziness 
of the investigators. It could also adversely affect defendants prosecuted based 
on informant testimony.41 
To some extent, the first caveat that emphasizes on the ‘impossibility’ 
requirement would render criminal informant use an option of last resort. Thus, 
where ordinary means of investigation can deliver the evidence needed to 
prosecute the crimes under consideration, criminal informant use is not 
permitted. Perhaps, this would be something easier said than done as it is 
difficult to sanction the exhaustion of all ordinary means of investigation. 
The policy envisages relevant laws to regulate the use of criminal informants. 
Although the Draft Criminal Procedure Code explicitly mentions criminal 
informants after the fact, it has limited the scope of special investigative 
techniques –active criminal informants (under covers) being one of them– only 
to organized crimes such as money laundering, corruption, trafficking in 
persons, and terrorism.42 
3.2 The anti-corruption laws   
The anti-corruption laws (in particular, Proclamation No. 434/2005, and 
Proclamation No. 881/2015) recognize criminal informant as one law 
enforcement tool.  But these proclamations do not define the concept in the 
context applied in this article. A related Proclamation issued to amend 
Proclamation No. 434/2005 (i.e., Proclamation No. 882/2015) contains a generic 
definition of the word ‘informant’43 to refer to law-abiding innocent persons or 
officers who supply information to law enforcement organs. As shown in 
section one above, however, this concept is quite distinct from criminal 
                                           
39 The ECJ Policy, supra 12, p 22-23. (Translation mine) 
40 Ibid.  
41 See generally Alemu Meheretu, supra note 32. 
42  See Articles 88-94 of the Draft criminal Procedure Code (as was valid in June 2019).  
43 Article 2(2) contains the following definition:  
   ‘Informant’ means any person who provides information, when he believes that 
corruption offences are committed, to appropriate organs or justice organs … includes 
an auditor who audits matters relating to offences of corruption… and anyone who 
inspects and investigates such offences. 
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informants per se which connotes suspects or defendants who provide evidence 
against fellow offenders in return to some concessions. This section examines 
the manner and the extent to which the law regulates the use of the latter, i.e., 
criminal informants in crimes of corruption. The following themes are identified 
for such an exercise throughout the article: standards of informant selection, 
concessions and benefits, safeguards for defendants and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
3.2.1 Standards for selection  
The Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation 
and Corruption Crimes Proclamation relieve a criminal informant from any 
criminal liability on condition that he provides substantial evidence as to the 
offence and the role of his partners before the case is taken to the court.44 Thus, 
the suspect`s /defendant’s willingness to provide any relevant evidence may not 
out rightly qualify him/her to benefit from the available concession which is 
immunity. Two cumulative conditions/standards are attached to the 
concession/benefit: the weight of the evidence he/she furnishes and the timing 
the assistance is given. Only supply of substantial evidence at an appropriate 
time makes a criminal informant eligible to the concession. Evidence is said to 
be substantial and entitles immunity where45:  
a) It is sufficient to bring conviction by itself; or  
b) It serves as a basis to lead to other evidences; or 
c) Corroborated with other evidence, it is sufficient to bring conviction, and 
its absence makes conviction unlikely.   
Of the above requirements, sub-article (a) appears to be too theoretical. It is 
less practical to imagine that a testimony of an informant alone or perhaps any 
other piece of evidence produced by the informant alone will be sufficient to 
sustain a conviction in most corruption cases. Obviously, it needs to be 
corroborated with another evidence such as documents, audit reports, other 
witnesses or even another informant evidence, etc. Conversely, this requirement 
can create an impression that criminal informant evidence alone warrants a valid 
conviction, which is problematic given its inherent unreliability.  
Two more points deserve discussion in relation to ‘substantial evidence’. The 
first relates to the issue as to who determines the value of evidence /testimony 
which qualifies for immunity from prosecution. The language of the law seems 
                                           
44 See Article 43(1), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
Proclamation, Proclamation No. 434/2005 (herein after the Revised Anti-Corruption 
Special Procedure Proclamation); See also Article 8 (1) and (2) of the Corruption Crimes 
Proclamation No.881/2015(which recognize informant use and give cross-reference to the 
Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation regarding details). 
45 Article 43(2), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation. 
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to suggest that this power is reserved to the executive46 apparently with no 
judicial review mechanism put in place. This could risk the rights of the 
defendant and/or the criminal informant. The second issue relates to the time 
when the informant gets the immunity. Is it required that the evidence should 
actually bring in either of the results mentioned from (a)-(c) above?  Evidently, 
a probability that either of the results will materialize is sufficient. This is clear 
from the timing requirement which demands the informant to provide evidence 
“before the case is taken to court.” Thus, the executive may not withhold the 
immunity waiting until the informant testifies before court. Indeed, the law 
demands the former to issue a letter attesting the immunity granted.47 
The second prerequisite for criminal informant use in corruption cases relates 
to timeliness, i.e., cooperation should be extended “before the case is taken to 
the court.” This refers to the time before charge is instituted thereby restricting 
the domain of criminal informant candidacy only to suspects as opposed to the 
accused or defendants. The possible rationale for this could relate to fairness and 
efficiency considerations. In addition to protecting defendants, it would promote 
thorough and effective investigation, encourage prudent charging decision 
(whom to charge and whom to use as a witness), spare time and resources that 
would otherwise be utilized for investigation or search of evidence.  
But what if the accused expresses his willingness to cooperate after charge is 
instituted or amidst the hearing of the prosecution evidence, which is common 
in practice? While the law unequivocally refuses to recognize such assistance, 
the practice appears to be uneven. Some prosecutors insist that the appropriate 
time for cooperation is during the investigation stage or until the case is brought 
before court thereby rejecting any willingness to cooperate thereafter for it lacks 
legal backing and might involve a tactical move.48 On the other hand, others 
welcome any cooperation from criminal informants any time before the 
finalization of the hearing of prosecution evidence.49 The practice of the 
judiciary also reflects both trends.50 In one corruption case51 involving five 
defendants, the court endorsed prosecution`s move to withdraw charges against 
two of the defendants after its witnesses were heard. The prosecution was 
                                           
46 See Article 43(1) that grants such power to the then Anti-Corruption Commissioner (now 
transferred to the Attorney General by virtue of Proclamation No. 943/2016), and to 
appropriate organs vested with the power to investigate and prosecute corruption crimes. 
See Article 2(3), the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation. 
47 Id, Article 43(3). 
48 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, pp.37-39. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51Federal Prosecutor vs. Abebe Birhane and others, Federal High Court, File No. 203074, 
30/06/2010 (Ethiopian Calendar). 
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allowed to use such defendants as witnesses against the rest of the defendants on 
the ground that the issue is one of withdrawal and production of additional 
evidence pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code which does not, as such, 
involve use of immunity from prosecution. Surely, apart from deflecting the 
issue, this is not in line with the timing requirement of the anticorruption law 
discussed above, which is the relevant and specific law to the case at hand.52 In 
another corruption case53 involving three defendants, the court rightly rejected 
the prosecution`s motion to switch one of the defendants into a witness on the 
ground that the motion jeopardizes the constitutional right to defence as the 
witness learns the defence strategy of his associates and other incriminating 
information on his associates while in prison; and this distorts the balance and 
fairness of the litigation. 
The writer believes that the timing for cooperation should be regulated in 
such a way that the earlier the cooperation, the larger the benefits. The 
proscription that limits informant use to be before charging needs to be pushed 
forward.  In so long as vital evidence can be obtained, prosecutors should accept 
cooperation extended any time before the hearing of prosecution evidence. This 
promotes efficiency and effectiveness and would not compromise fairness.  
However, distinctions of benefits should be made between those who cooperate 
at the earliest opportunity (during investigation) and those who waited until the 
hearing of prosecution evidence. For instance, for the latter, only sentence 
reduction may be considered which presupposes severance of the trial. 
The foregoing discussion reveals that the law provides limited (only 
evidential and timing standards) and general standards for selection of criminal 
informants. Nonetheless, these are not the only relevant standards that should 
inform criminal informant selection. The anticorruption law overlooks other 
essential standards such as the degree of participation, the seriousness and 
complexity of the crime, the criminal record of the informant, the availability of 
other evidence, the accuracy and reliability of the evidence/testimony and the 
risks to the criminal informant. Thus, for instance evidence from less culpable 
informants accused of less serious crimes can be used to convict more culpable 
ones accused of serious crimes. 
3.2.2 Concessions and benefits  
Under the law, criminal informant use in crimes of corruption involves suspects 
trading evidence/information for immunity on condition that the above 
evidential and timing standards are met. It is interesting to see whether a 
criminal informant who does not satisfy the above requirements can get any 
                                           
52 For more discussion, see Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21 and 32. 
53 Federal Prosecutor vs. Getachew Walelign and others, Federal High Court, File No. 
209610, 18/07/2010 EC. 
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concession other than immunity (such as sentence reduction). Unlike, witness 
protection law, the Anti-Corruption law, does not expressly recognize other 
concessions for defendants. Short of immunity, for those who do not satisfy part 
of the above requirements, other concessions such as mitigation of sentences 
need to be available. For instance, those who fail to satisfy the timing 
requirement can be considered for other lenient treatments such as special 
sentence reduction; apart from those triggered by mitigating circumstances 
envisaged under the substantive law. However, this can only be achieved in a 
separate trial for one cannot be a witness against a defendant with whom he is 
charged and tried jointly. Perhaps it could also involve plea bargaining proper, 
in which case the defendant may benefit from charge or sentence concessions, 
as the case may be. 
One may also wonder whether immunity is granted horizontally to any 
criminal informant who provides substantial evidence without considering the 
seriousness of the crime and the degree of participation and culpability of the 
informant and that of the defendant against whom evidence is sought. 
Ostensibly, absence of such factors under the law suggests that this can be the 
case. Nonetheless, this is problematic and would defeat the very purpose of 
using criminal informants, where seriousness of the crime and degree of 
participation are key factors; hence the adage: using a small fish to catch the 
bigger ones. It will not promote the purposes of punishment, either. 
Another benefit that could be available to criminal informants relates to 
protection measures. Apart from the witness protection proclamation, this is 
evident from the power of the Anti-corruption Commission to extend protection 
to witnesses and whistle blowers pursuant to the law54, which is now transferred 
to the Attorney General. A criminal informant qualifies as a ‘protected person’ –
within the meaning of the relevant law i.e., Witness Protection Proclamation– 
where three conditions are met, namely, those which relate to the seriousness of 
the offence, the value of the evidence produced, and the threat of danger the 
informant faces.55 Such criminal informants may benefit from the protection 
measures available under the Proclamation which generally include protection 
of anonymity, immunity, protection from retaliatory measures, providing 
remedial measures when retaliation occurs, and counselling services.56 
However, conflating the anti-corruption law with the witness protection 
proclamation raises many issues. The disparity of conditions attached to the 
concessions in the two proclamations complicates the application of such 
                                           
54 Article 7(8), The Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment 
Proclamation No.433/2005. 
55 For detailed discussion of such conditions, see Section 3.5 below. 
56 For the complete list of such measures, see Article 4(1)(a) through (t) of the Witness 
Protection Proclamation. 
454                            MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No. 3                               December 2019 
 
 
measures. A case in point is immunity, the invocation of which involves 
disparate conditions under the two laws.57 This deadlock can be temporarily 
resolved by limiting the applicability of conditions under the anticorruption law 
for immunity purposes while the conditions under the witness protection law 
apply to protection measures other than immunity. 
Another issue relates to whether pecuniary related concessions could be the 
subject of an informant deal. The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure 
Proclamation (as amended by Proclamation No. 882/2015) seems to have 
excluded pecuniary concessions connected to the crime in informant deals.58 
Thus, a criminal informant should pay back the benefits he derives from the 
crime of corruption. However, an informant who is involved in bribing a person 
for a service he is otherwise entitled to obtain lawfully, is allowed to get back 
the amount he has put for bribing, from the proceeds of the crime upon 
disclosing such bribe.59 This seems to motivate such informants to come 
forward and expose more culpable persons without fear of being prosecuted of 
bribing. 
Other pecuniary benefits unrelated to the crime of corruption could be 
available to criminal informants. Thus, pecuniary benefits recognized as 
protection measures under the witness protection proclamation such as per 
diems and transport allowances, medical treatment for injuries caused by 
retaliatory measures, arrangement of employment and education opportunities, 
etc. could apply to criminal informants, as appropriate.60 
The anti-corruption proclamation embodies a general protection clause that 
evidence acquired from a criminal informant will not be used against him.61 Yet, 
the language of the law under Article 43, Sub-Articles (3) &(4) of Proclamation 
No. 434/2005 creates an impression that this protection is limited to suspects to 
                                           
57 For more discussion on this, see Sections 3.2 and 3.5. 
58 See Article 43(6) of Proclamation No. 434/2005 and Article 34 of same Proclamation as 
amended by the Revised Anti-corruption special procedure and Rules of Evidence 
(Amendment) Proclamation No. 882/2015. 
       Article 34(1) of the Proclamation provides: “The defendant shall return the property 
acquired by the commission of the crime and the benefit derived from the property or the 
amount equivalent to it or the amount equivalent with the damage sustained by the 
commission of the crime.” 
59 Article 8 (3) of Corruption Crimes Proclamation No. 881/2015 reads: “The bribe, gift or 
valuable thing a person has given in consideration for service he has lawfully obtained or 
is entitled to obtain shall be restored to him out of the property forfeited to the state on 
account of the crime, where he has disclosed his act of giving such an advantage.” 
60 For more discussion on the requirements and the available protection measures, see 
sections 3.5 below. 
61 See 43(3), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation. 
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whom immunity is granted under Sub-Article 3; while apparently leaving out 
suspects whose immunity is revoked under Sub-Article 4.62  
As a rule any statement made or evidence disclosed in connection with 
informant agreement negotiation or included in the agreement should not be 
used against the criminal informant regardless of the outcome of the agreement. 
This, in addition to motivating potential informants to cooperate, promotes 
fairness to the defendant who provides or agrees to provide evidence in 
anticipation of concessions from the state. This rule needs to be reflected under 
the anti-corruption law. However, some necessary caveats should be made to the 
effect that the informant may not, for example, invoke the protection against 
perjury or misleading of justice charges.  
Another issue that deserves some reflection is whether the protection clause 
extends to civil lawsuits against a criminal informant. Although this, in 
principle, depends on the nature of immunity granted to the informant, the 
contextual reading of Article 43 of Proclamation No. 434/2005 titled “immunity 
from prosecution”, and the unequivocal exclusion of the proceeds of the crime 
from the subject of the informant agreement suggest that the protection clause is 
limited to criminal responsibility. Surely, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
which triggers the protection clause, does not apply to civil matters. Thus, 
arguably, any evidence obtained in relation to the informant deal may be used 
for civil lawsuits by the government. The concession due to the informant i.e., 
grant of immunity is apparently contingent upon his agreement to return the 
proceeds of the crime. 
3.2.3 Safeguards for defendants 
The Anti-corruption law does not provide adequate protection for defendants 
prosecuted based on informant testimony against risks such as unreliable or 
wrongful conviction and other concerns of unfairness.  From the reading of the 
anti-corruption law, one may take the timing requirement, which discourages the 
late use of criminal informants, as a guarantee for the defence and the ‘fair’ use 
of criminal informants.  
However, in the main, common safeguards63 –such as legal counsel 
(mandatory legal representation), the right of disclosure (of the cooperation 
agreement and other culpable and exculpable evidence), liberal cross 
                                           
62 Sub-Articles 3 and 4 of Article read as follows:    
(3) Where the suspect is given immunity, the appropriate organ shall certify it in writing. 
The appropriate organ may not use the evidence acquired in accordance with this 
Article against the suspect. 
(4) Where the suspect fails to provide the evidence or give testimony according to the 
agreement, the decision to give immunity shall be revoked.  
63 For more discussion on this, see Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, section 4.4. 
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examination covering matters beyond subjects of examination-in-chief (for 
example such details relevant to test informant`s credibility as his criminal 
record, the nature of concession he obtains from the prosecution, etc.), evidence 
corroboration requirements, and enhanced judicial review on the selection, 
admissibility,  weight of the informant testimony–  are lacking or scanty at best. 
On the contrary, the Proclamation attaches equal weight to the testimony of 
criminal informants and ordinary witnesses; and it demands justice actors to 
treat these categories of testimony alike.64 The merit of this rule is open to 
doubt. It could discourage justice actors from approaching criminal informant 
testimony with suspicion and review it with extra caution having regard to its 
inherent proneness to unreliability. It would rather invite them to attach 
undeserved weight to such testimony to the detriment of accurate 
outcome/verdict. 
3.2.4 Enforcement  mechanisms 
While criminal informant use presupposes the conclusion of a formal agreement 
between the prosecution and the suspect, there is no formal agreement required 
by law;65 nor is it concluded in practice.66 The anti-corruption law merely 
requires the Attorney General (which was formerly the power of the anti-
corruption commissioner) to certify the immunity granted to the informant in 
writing.67 Nor are there any clear enforcement mechanisms of the agreement 
stipulated by law. Prosecutors seem to have superior leverage to enforce the deal 
than criminal informants. The use of leading questions to manage informants 
who turn hostile68, the threat to vacate the immunity and pursue charges of 
perjury or misleading justice69, as appropriate, provide prosecutors a strong 
leverage against any breaches of agreement by the informant.  
In contrast, the suspect or defendant-turned informant remains at the mercy 
of the prosecution and lacks meaningful enforcement mechanism. Perhaps, in 
principle they may challenge the decision of prosecutors administratively or 
before court using immunity certification letter, if granted. However, this is 
easier said than done. First, in the absence clear enforcement mechanism, the 
                                           
64 See Article 43(5), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation, which 
reads: The testimony of the person who has been given immunity from prosecution shall 
have equal weight as the testimony of ordinary witness. 
65 Article 43(4) speaks of ‘agreement’. The close reading of the provision suggests that this 
is not a formal agreement rather a generic term used to indicate the informant`s 
commitment to cooperate which can be expressed orally.  
66 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, p.69. 
67 See 43(3), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation. 
68 Article 44 of the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation authorizes 
prosecutors to use leading questions upon obtaining the permission of the court.  
69 See Article 446 of the 2004 Criminal Code of Ethiopia. 
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prosecution may easily evade or delay it until evidence is furnished thereby 
leaving criminal informants vulnerable. Second, the decision to grant, deny, 
withhold or revoke immunity is not subject to judicial review. 
It is possible for a prosecutor to receive the information and refuse to honour 
his/her promises unless he/she is concerned with its repercussions on 
informant`s future cooperation. While this problem would be quite pronounced 
in the informal criminal informant use, it also at times occurs in crimes of 
corruption where guarantees are provided by law to the effect that evidence 
obtained from the informant cannot be used against him.70 In one corruption 
case,71 a criminal informant led to all co-offenders in exchange of promise of 
immunity for his/her own crimes. But, the prosecutor withdrew the promise and 
pressed a charge on three counts to have the defendant convicted who was 
eventually sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment. Although, the reasons were 
not clear, the defendant`s huge involvement in the crime might be the possible 
explanation. If that was the case, the prosecution should have investigated the 
case further, to at least know the degree of the informant’s involvement and 
identify the right candidate before making any promise or agreement with the 
informant. Although this case may not capture the entire picture, –which 
warrants generalization– it can illustrate the potential for prosecutorial renege on 
promises, which is not acceptable by any standard –both from the interests of 
the government and that of the individual defendant. This renege offends 
principles of fairness; it also contradicts the very objective of informant 
agreement –by eroding suspects’ confidence on the prosecutor and discouraging 
future cooperation from other informants. 
On top of absence of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms, the law does 
not articulate the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of the agreement. The 
court should be mandated to review the selection of criminal informants 
focusing on the standards used by the prosecution, and assess the reliability and 
weight of criminal informant testimony freely and thoroughly having regard to 
its inherent problems.  
3.3 The Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation 
The Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of 
Migrants Proclamation No. 909/2015 (herein after the Anti-trafficking and 
Smuggling Proclamation), which is currently under review for amendment, 
embraces special investigative techniques and sources of evidence that are 
believed to be instrumental in combating the crime under consideration. 
Included among these are infiltrating criminal organizations, surveillance, 
                                           
70 Article 43(3), The Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure Proclamation. 
71 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, p 72. 
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interceptions, simulation (undercover), and criminal informant use.72 Leaving 
other investigative techniques and sources of evidence aside, this section briefly 
reviews the use of criminal informants as is recognized under the Anti-
trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation. 
3.3.1 Standards for selection  
Article 23 of the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation –titled ‘suspects 
[sic] immunity from prosecution’– sanctions criminal informant use and rewards 
a criminal informant with immunity or sentence reduction in return to the 
assistance he provides towards the prosecution of other criminal participants. 
However this is not unconditional. The Proclamation embodies three 
requirements: 
The first precondition relates to evidence weight requirement.  For a criminal 
informant to be eligible to the benefits attached to cooperation, he needs to 
furnish substantial evidence as to the crime and against co-participants. This 
requirement is the verbatim copy of the standard stipulated under the anti-
corruption proclamation discussed above in section 3.2. Thus, since the meaning 
of substantial evidence and the issues that arise in connection with it are similar, 
there is no need to discuss it here.  
The second requirement refers to time requirement. A criminal participant’s 
cooperation as a criminal informant must be made at the right time, i.e., before 
the case is taken to court. This is again similar with the requirement envisaged 
in the anti-corruption laws discussed earlier. 
The third requirement is related with centralized decision-making regarding 
the selection of criminal informant. The mandate to select criminal informants 
from among criminal participants is not the responsibility of individual 
prosecutors. Rather it rests with the then Minister of Justice and now the 
Attorney General. This requirement, if taken only as a requirement of approval 
/a system of internal review, would help scrutinize potential errors, abuses and 
rooms for corruption. However, the reading of the provision suggests otherwise 
because the prosecution cannot use criminal informants unless instructed by the 
Attorney General. This violates the functional autonomy of individual 
prosecutors, and its practicality is open to doubt. Centralized personal decision 
by the Attorney General on the day-to-day routines/exercise of prosecutorial 
discretions such as selection of criminal informants is neither practical nor 
justifiable. That is why in practice, this has been delegated to department heads 
of the prosecution units.73 Thus, this requirement needs to be framed in such a 
way that the decision of prosecutors to select and reward criminal informant 
                                           
72 See Articles 18 and 23 of the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation. 
73 Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, p.42 
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needs to be justified through the process of approval from supervisors/ 
department heads.  
As with crime of corruption, the standards provided for selecting criminal 
informants in trafficking and smuggling in persons lack adequacy and clarity.  
However, to some extent the latter considers additional standards that relate to 
the degree of participation and the degree of harm victims suffer, albeit 
erroneously as shown below. Thus, immunity will be withheld for criminal 
informants whose crime results in the death of a victim or removal of his organs 
or exposure to incurable diseases.74 Instead, such informant will be eligible for 
sentence reduction.75 
Other important standards such as the seriousness and complexity of the 
crime (apart from its impact on victims), the criminal record of the informant, 
the availability of other evidence, the accuracy and reliability of the 
evidence/testimony, the risks to the criminal informant, among others, are not 
expressly embraced under the law. Moreover, there are no internal guidelines 
that address these matters. 
3.3.2 Concessions and benefits  
As opposed to the first two requirements discussed above, one major departure 
of the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation from other laws under 
discussion is that it embraces broad concessions, albeit vaguely worded. The 
concessions to criminal informants include partial or full immunity from 
prosecution or reduction of sentence.76 Conflating concessions entails complex 
questions of enforceability. The first problem relates to the meaning of partial 
immunity: Is it about ‘charge bargaining’ where one or either of the several 
counts is dropped in exchange for a testimony/evidence combined with a guilty 
plea? Or does it refer to use immunity (limited to the offence to the prosecution 
of which he supplies information) as opposed to transactional immunity 
(complete immunity covering any related transaction)?  As the nature and scope 
of the concessions lack clarity, each interpretation has its own implications in 
terms of scope, nature, duration, effects, etc., of the respective obligations and 
benefits of the parties (the prosecution and the informant). 
Another issue relates to the problems that accompany sentence reduction to 
criminal informants. Although plea bargaining and informant use may overlap 
and operate concurrently, this is not regulated properly. Some of the relevant 
stipulations are not in tune with the purposes of negotiated justice in general and 
the rationales of criminal informants use, in particular. Such issues abound on 
                                           
74 See Article 23(2) of the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation. 
75 For more, see section C below. 
76 See Article 23(1) and (2) of Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation. 
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the conditions attached to sentence reduction.77 While degree of participation is 
not expressly indicated as a requirement for total or partial immunity, it makes 
no sense to use it as prerequisite for sentence reduction. This is because; first, by 
definition the lesser the degree of participation, the lesser the punishment would 
be, ceteris paribus.  It is simply redundant to mention degree of participation as 
one factor for sentence determination. Moreover, the requirement seems to 
suggest that those criminal informants having higher degree of participation do 
not deserve any sentence mitigation regardless of providing substantial evidence 
against others and pleading guilty of their own crimes. This stands in clear 
contrast to the essence of sentence bargaining which involves a defendant’s 
justified expectation of some sentence reduction in return for pleading guilty.  It 
also negates the rationale of criminal informant use. 
Therefore, the requirement of degree of participation should rather be used as 
one precondition to reward criminal informants with immunity and its use in 
sentence rewards should be limited to determining the amount of sentence 
reduction; and not for eligibility purposes as such. So long as the informant 
provides substantial evidence and pleads guilty to his own crime, he should be 
eligible for sentence reduction regardless of his degree of participation in the 
crime or any other condition such as victim`s injury. 
The other precondition to determine the nature of rewards to criminal 
informants concerns harms sustained by victims. The death of a victim, stealing 
of his organs, or contracting him incurable disease disqualify the informant from 
receiving immunity, and instead transforms the informant to  be a candidate for 
sentence reduction depending on his degree of participation and the value of 
evidence he furnishes. 78 
It is interesting to note that the above factors are alternative. While this 
automatic exclusion of immunity is meant to protect victims of the crime and 
the public, it is likely to entail undesirable outcomes. By risking no prosecution 
at all, it can stand in contrast to the very purpose of employing criminal 
informant testimony: fighting the crime and protecting victims. There is no good 
reason to exclude immunity simply without connecting the suspect heavily with 
the above harms sustained by victims. So long as the suspect`s degree of 
participation is low and he provides substantial evidence against more culpable 
participants, immunity should remain an option, albeit as a last resort. 
                                           
77 See Article 23(2) of the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation which reads: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article 1 of this article, when the victim dies, his 
organ is removed or he is exposed to incurable disease, the suspect shall not be set free 
from prosecution; provided however, that depending on his participation and the 
usefulness of the evidence provided, his punishment shall be reduced.” 
78 See Article 23(2) of the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation. 
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Unlike anti-corruption law, the Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation 
remains silent on whether pecuniary concessions connected to the crime can be 
subjects of informant agreement. This should be expressly excluded for it would 
discourage potential traffickers as well as abuses and corruptions in the law 
enforcement. With respect to pecuniary concessions unconnected to the crime, it 
stands to reason to claim that the Witness Protection Proclamation may apply. 
Thus, any criminal informant implicated with the crime of trafficking in persons 
and smuggling may avail himself of the protections available under the Witness 
Protection Proclamation, including pecuniary benefits provided that he complies 
with the requirements set out there.79 
Similarly, the law provides no assurance to a criminal informant that 
prohibits the use of his statements or the evidence he has disclosed –in 
connection with the informant agreement– against him. This discourages 
informant cooperation and could leave criminal informants in uncertainty, and 
thus needs legal intervention.  
3.3.3 Safeguards for defendants  
Like defendants in crimes of corruption, defendants who are prosecuted on 
charges of trafficking and smuggling in persons based on informant testimony 
lack special protections which duly consider the inherent problems of criminal 
informant use; notably unreliability of the testimony. The following protections 
are absent or at least are not explicitly embraced by law: 80   
- mandatory legal counsel to the defendant against whom informant evidence 
is used,  
- the right of disclosure (i.e., to have access to the cooperation agreement and 
other culpable and exculpable evidence so that the defendant can test the 
credibility of informant evidence),  
- liberal cross examination (which goes to matters beyond the scope of 
examination-in-chief and accommodates relevant impeachment materials 
including antecedents of the informant, the concessions received, etc.), 
- evidence corroboration requirements (a requirement that informant evidence 
should be corroborated), and  
- enhanced judicial review on the selection, admissibility, and weight of the 
informant testimony. 
3.3.4 Enforcement mechanisms  
The general problems of enforcement discussed above in the context of crime of 
corruption are also valid here. At times the problems are even more pronounced 
                                           
79 For discussion on the requirements and the available protection measures, see Section 3.5 
below. 
80 For detailed discussions, see Alemu Meheretu, supra note 21, Section 4.4. 
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with regard to the law on anti-trafficking and smuggling in persons. For 
instance, if one looks at the basis for enforcement of informant agreement, the 
law envisages neither a formal contract nor an official letter certifying its 
existence. This complicates enforceability. Sanctions on reneges such as 
exclusion of informant testimony in the event of collapse of the agreement, 
specific performance as appropriate, and other remedies if parties fail to 
discharge their commitments, are not recognized by law. 
Apart from that, specific problems also abound.  A case in point is the 
enforceability of sentence reduction, which as it stands now, is uncertain and 
unclear: Is it contingent upon delivery of the testimony or information? If so, is 
it dependent on the outcome of the trial? What guarantees are available for the 
defendant against possible reneges? What is the role of the court? All these 
remain dubious and involve complex issues of fairness, accuracy and efficiency. 
Perhaps viewing sentence reduction either as simple mitigation due to 
extenuating factors or a special sentence reduction triggered by both plea 
bargaining and cooperation agreement can help address some of these impasses. 
The first approach is like ordinary cases where the prosecution81 or defence 
may raise mitigating factors (substantial assistance and lesser degree of 
participation, conditions attached to sentence reduction in the proclamation 
under consideration) so that the court mitigates punishment following general 
rules of mitigation. However, this approach is less feasible for it makes sentence 
reduction, which overlaps with sentence mitigation (envisaged under the 
substantive law) redundant.  
The second approach, which is a feasible one, presupposes both plea 
agreement and informant/cooperation agreement between the prosecution and 
the informant whereby the latter not only pleads guilty but also supplies 
substantial evidence in exchange of sentence reduction, which the court will 
review and approve. Determining whether the threshold of substantial assistance 
is met would be within the prosecution’s remit subject to judicial review, and 
should not depend on the outcome of the trial since it may encourage false 
testimony. On the other hand, the court will determine the validity of the guilty 
plea. The Proclamation needs to regulate all the above issues. 
3.4 The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation  
Article 33 of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 authorizes courts to 
treat cooperating defendants/criminal informants leniently. To benefit from 
lenient punishment, a defendant is expected to plead guilty with repentance or 
disclose the identity of other co-offenders. Here, the law combines plea 
                                           
81 Note that Article 149(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code authorizes the prosecution to 
raise mitigating circumstances. 
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bargaining proper with criminal informant use when it demands the defendant to 
plead guilty or to disclose the identity of other participants in order to benefit 
from the available concessions. 
Criminal informant use in the context of the anti-terrorism law is unique in 
three senses: First, unlike other laws discussed above, neither the provision of 
information against crime mates nor the weight of the information is mandatory 
to get the benefits of cooperation. What is expected of the informant is to plead 
guilty of his own crime with remorse or simply expose others. It is interesting to 
note that pleading guilty and exposing others are alternatives, not cumulative 
requirements. Thus, in theory a defendant/an informant may receive concessions 
in three scenarios: exposing others of crimes of terrorism; pleading guilty with 
repentance and explaining the details of his/her own crime, and doing the 
combination of the two. 
In relation to the requirement of pleading guilty with repentance, the 
daunting task of forging a nexus between guilty pleas and repentance/remorse 
need some discussion. Since guilty pleas could be tendered for other motives 
extraneous to remorse (such as tactical reasons), it is quite difficult for the 
concerned organs (the prosecution and the court) to read the defendants’ psyche 
and determine whether a given guilty plea truly involves repentance.  
Further, what is less clear is the degree of cooperation required from the 
criminal informant. What does the phrase ‘disclose the identity’ of other 
criminal participants mean under Article 33?82 Is there any requirement for such 
an informant to testify against fellow participants or is it just enough for him to 
identify and name fellow suspects? The apparent reading of the provision seems 
to suggest the latter. However, as a matter of pragmatism it is likely to be the 
case that the criminal informant may assume a dual status: as a defendant for his 
own crime and as a witness against other fellow participants. This dual status 
would raise procedural issues on how to proceed with each case without one 
compromising the fairness of the other, which triggers among others severance 
of the trial. 
Second, unlike its counterparts, there is no requirement of timing expressly 
indicated under the anti-terrorism law. While other proclamations demand that 
the assistance of the criminal informant should come before the institution of a 
charge, the anti-terrorism law leaves this open. Thus, in principle such 
assistance can be given any time before judgment.  However, such an expansive 
                                           
82 The article reads: “The court may mitigate the punishment, upon a request made by the 
public prosecutor where the defendant repents about his act of committing any of the 
crimes mentioned under this Proclamation and cooperates in elaborating in detail the 
manner of the commission of the crime or discloses the identities of the persons who 
participated in the commission of the crime.” (Emphasis added) 
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construction of the timing would undermine the rights of the defence against 
whom the informant furnishes incriminating evidence and hence the fairness of 
the criminal process, to the detriment of the former. Indeed, one may argue that 
under the existing Criminal Procedure Code the right time for a defendant to 
enter plea, particularly to plead guilty (which is a requirement in criminal 
informant use in terrorism cases), would be when the charge is read out to him 
and asked by the court to enter a plea.83 Thus, any subsequent guilty plea should 
not be admitted, thereby excluding subsequent criminal informant use. That 
said, as a matter of law nothing explicitly prevents the court from admitting late 
guilty pleas. Indeed, courts do welcome late guilty pleas in practice.84 
Third, the benefit a criminal informant draws is limited to mitigation of 
sentences as against immunities. Thus, regardless of the probative value of the 
information he may supply, and the contribution he may furnish in the 
prosecution of others, a defendant charged with terrorism may not benefit from 
immunity. Here, one might argue that so long as the criminal informant fulfils 
the conditions provided under the Witness Protection Proclamation85, he may 
qualify for immunity. Nonetheless, in the presence of specific exclusion by the 
special law (i.e., anti-terrorism law) this would be farfetched. 
One may question the need for re-stating guilty plea generated sentence 
mitigation here, which is an established and already recognized factor in 
sentence determination under substantive criminal law.86 Perhaps, it only makes 
sense, if this is construed to mean that the lawmaker targets special sentence 
reduction to be effected upon the recommendation of the prosecution, other than 
the one already recognized by the substantive law, which in effect would 
involve sentence bargaining. Otherwise, it would be redundant. 
This is not to suggest, however, that criminal informants in terrorism crimes 
are not entitled to receive other concessions and benefits. So long as they 
comply with the conditions laid down under the witness protection 
proclamation87, they are by definition entitled to receive the procedural and 
substantive protections as well as pecuniary benefits listed under Article 4(1) of 
the Proclamation,88 other than immunity which is unequivocally excluded by the 
                                           
83 Articles 132 and 135 of the 1961 Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia. 
84 Alemu Meheretu (2014), Introducing Plea bargaining in Ethiopia: Concerns and 
Prospects (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, UK), pp.159-60. 
85 See section 3.5 below. 
86 See Article 82(1) (e) of the 2004 Criminal Code of Ethiopia.  
87 See section 3.5 below. 
88 Such protections include, hearing of testimony in camera or behind a screen, relocation, 
withholding or change of identity, and pecuniary benefits such as per diem and transport 
allowance, medical treatment for injuries flowing from retaliatory measures, counselling 
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Anti-terrorism Proclamation. With the law requiring the forfeiture of proceeds 
of the crime of terrorism and the property of a terrorist89, no pecuniary 
concessions connected with the crime are available for a criminal informant in 
terrorism crimes who only benefits from sentence reduction under the law. 
Before concluding this section, it is important to briefly outline the 
guarantees available for co-defendants who are prosecuted based on informant 
testimony drawn from their fellow defendants. In addition to other guarantees 
discussed above, there should be special protections available for such 
defendants. These include the following:  
- the two trials should proceed separately;  
- where assistance is provided, the benefits to the criminal informant must not 
depend on the outcome of the other trial to which assistance is given; and 
- any admission or guilty plea the informant tenders should not be used to the 
prejudice of a co-defendant unless it is disclosed as part of the informant 
deal. 
3.5 The Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers of Criminal 
Offences Proclamation 
The Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers of Criminal Offences 
Proclamation No. 699/2010 (herein after “Witness Protection Proclamation”) 
stipulates several types of protection measures to witnesses, whistleblowers and 
their families.90 The Witness Protection Proclamation defines ‘whistleblower or 
witness’ as “a person who has given or agrees to give information or has acted 
or agrees to act as a witness in the investigation or trial of an offence”.91 The 
word ‘person’ under this definition can be construed to encompass both a law-
abiding innocent informant as well as a criminal informant.  
As part of such protection schemes extended to witnesses and whistleblowers 
in return to providing information or testimony, one finds witness immunity.92 
Thus, while witnesses who qualify for immunity under this law are criminal 
informants –co-defendants or suspects who might have been prosecuted for their 
                                                                                                            
services, arranging education and employment opportunities, etc. For a complete list of 
the protection measures, see Article 4(1) of the Witness Protection Proclamation   
89 See Article 27, the Anti-terrorism Proclamation. 
90 Article 2(2) defines protected persons as: “a witness, a whistle blower, or a family 
member of a witness of a whistle blower who has entered into a protection agreement with 
the ministry [of Justice].” To enter such an agreement and benefit from the protection 
measures the seriousness of the crime for whose prosecution the information is supplied, 
the essentiality of the information, the degree of threat of danger posed are prerequisites. 
See article 3 of Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers of Criminal Offences 
Proclamation No.699/2010. (Hereinafter “Witness protection proclamation”). 
91 Id., Article 21. 
92 Id., Article 4(1) (f). 
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own crimes–, other catalogue of protection measures primarily presuppose law-
abiding persons who simply provide information or testimony. Nonetheless, this 
is not to suggest that such category of protection measures are mutually 
exclusive, instead as shown below they may apply in combination, as 
appropriate.93 
The protection/benefit of immunity is not available to all witnesses or 
whistleblowers –to all criminal informants in context of this discussion. The law 
provides for the following three standards as prerequisites for immunity94: 
The seriousness of the crime 
The crime to the investigation or prosecution of which the information is 
supplied should be punishable with rigorous imprisonment of 10 or more years 
or death.95 Criminal informants can only be used for the investigation or 
prosecution of serious crimes punishable with 10 years and more. Thus, 
arguably, the seriousness of the crime the informant was involved and his 
degree of participation are not relevant in the selection of a criminal informant 
provided that his crime does not overlap with that of the defendant. Neither the 
complexity of the crime to be prosecuted, nor the reliability of informant 
information is recognized for selecting a criminal informant. These serious 
limitations and gaps of the law need intervention. For the purpose of this 
standard, the lower punishment range is irrelevant. The phrase “…without 
having regard to the minimum period of rigorous imprisonment” under Article 3 
of the Proclamation makes it plain that what matters is the upper limit which 
must not be less than 10 years of imprisonment.96 
The absolute relevance of the evidence  
This standard relates to instances where offences cannot be detected or 
prosecuted in the absence of the informant`s assistance. This requirement in 
effect makes the use of criminal informant a last resort. Thus, where it is 
possible to effectively detect or prosecute the crime without the informant`s 
assistance, the law does not allow criminal informant use. On the other hand, 
compared to the threshold of substantial evidence required by the anti-
corruption and the anti-trafficking and smuggling proclamations discussed 
                                           
93 Id., Article 4(1). 
94 Id., Article 3 and 5. 
95 Beyond using the generic term `serious crimes`, the Criminal Policy goes further to name 
crimes in this regard. Included are “organized crimes”, corruption, terrorism, complex 
crimes and crimes of rioting. See the ECJ Policy, supra note 12, pp. 22-23. 
96 The article reads: “The protection under this Proclamation shall be applicable with respect 
to testimony or information given or investigation undertaken on a suspect punishable 
with rigorous imprisonment for ten or more years or with death without having regard to 
the minimum period of rigorous imprisonment…”  
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above, the witness protection proclamation, which employs a language97: “…the 
offence may not be revealed or established by other means…”, requires a higher 
standard that can be described as essential evidence requirement. Thus, for an 
informant to satisfy this requirement he must supply essential evidence that 
either reveals the offence or determines the successful prosecution of the 
offence –i.e., evidence in the absence of which the offence cannot be detected or 
prosecuted. It is important to note however that the executive determines the 
value of the evidence and the concessions attached thereto ex ante. It is not 
required that the evidence actually brings the intended outcomes. 
The degree of threat of danger the informant faces.   
This standard requires that a threat of serious danger to the life, physical 
security, freedom or property of the informant or his family be established. 
Although this standard is mainly relevant to extend other protection measures 
such as hearing of testimony in camera or behind a screen, relocation, 
withholding or change of identity, its validity to the determination of whether 
immunity should be granted to a criminal informant is open to debate. Thus, one 
may argue that where either of the above risks to the informant are established, 
procedural or substantive protection measures, should apply, as appropriate 
rather than excluding immunity.   
Where the foregoing prerequisites are satisfied cumulatively, a witness or 
whistleblower may be immune from offences for which he supplies information. 
In this sense, the protection of immunity presupposes the participation of the 
witness or whistleblower in a criminal act. Thus, it is available only to co-
offenders/participants in a criminal activity with a view to encourage them to 
come out and testify against their mates. 
Apparently, the concessions and benefits available to a criminal informant 
under the witness protection proclamation seem to be limited to immunity. 
However, with the Proclamation recognizing the application of procedural and 
substantive protection measures in combination98, other concessions including 
pecuniary ones can be considered. Thus, in addition to such procedural and 
substantive protection measures as withholding of identity, hearing in camera, 
relocation, change of identity; the criminal informant may, as appropriate, 
benefit from the following pecuniary benefits:99 transport allowance and per 
diem when summoned to testify; relocation cost where ordered; medical 
treatment free of charge for injuries due to retaliatory measures; funeral 
                                           
97 The relevant part of Article 3(1)(a) of the witness protection proclamation reads : “... 
where the offence may not be revealed or established by another means otherwise than by 
the testimony of the witness or the information of the whistleblower ...” 
98 See Article 4(1) of the Witness Protection Proclamation. 
99 Ibid. 
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expenses and provision of pecuniary subsidy to family for death caused by 
retaliatory measures; assistance in securing job and education opportunity; and 
counselling services. One important caution appears necessary in combining 
protection measures, in that the application of such measures must consider the 
specific features of criminal informant evidence. For instance, the protection of 
anonymity should be limited to the possible minimum and be extended with 
adequate counterbalancing measures (such as corroboration requirement, and 
rigorous judicial scrutiny) since it may induce unchecked criminal informant 
evidence, which is inherently prone to false incrimination. 
One the other hand, unlike the anti-corruption law, the witness protection 
proclamation provides no protection to a criminal informant that proscribes the 
use of his statements or any evidence he supplies against him. This would create 
disincentive for potential criminal informants. Nor does the Proclamation set 
forth adequate counterbalancing measures for defendants prosecuted based on 
the testimony of protected witnesses,100 including criminal informants. 
Conversely, Article 26 of the Proclamation provides that: “[t]he fact that a 
witness is entitled to protection in accordance with this Proclamation may not be 
invoked as a ground to diminish the credibility of his testimony.” This utterly 
ignores the power of protection measures, in particular immunity, in generating 
unreliable evidence.101 
Finally, it is worthwhile to reflect on the enforceability of criminal informant 
deal under witness protection law. Like other laws discussed above, the witness 
protection law is marred by lack of enforcement mechanisms. The law neither 
recognizes a formal agreement for granting immunity, which it does with other 
measures of protection,102 nor does it empower courts to enforce immunity 
agreements, if any. On the contrary, the Attorney General’s decision on 
protection measures are not subject to judicial review.103 Moreover, while the 
law imposes specific obligations on the parties with respect to some protection 
measures as is the case with those from (g)-(k) of Article 4(1),104 it refrains from 
doing so with regard to immunity. 
                                           
100 For some discussion on this, see Alemu Meheretu and Awol Alemayehu, ‘The Ethiopian 
Law on the Right to Confrontation’, Bahir Dar University Journal of Law, forthcoming. 
101 On this particular blemish of informant evidence, see note 28 above; see also Alemu 
Meheretu, supra note 32. 
102 See Articles 8 to 22 of Witness Protection Proclamation where a formal protection 
agreement is required in such protection measures as physical protection of persons and 
property, provision of secure residence including relocation, concealing identity or 
ownership, and change of identity.  
103 Id., Article 25. 
104 Id., Article 11. 




In order to control crime, notably organized crimes, jurisdictions employ various 
investigative and evidence generating tools including the use of criminal 
informants. Ethiopia is not exception to this. The use of criminal informants has 
been recognized in four proclamations: the anti-corruption, the anti-terrorism, 
the anti-trafficking and smuggling, and the witness protection proclamations. 
The three proclamations namely, the anti-corruption, anti-terrorism and anti-
trafficking and smuggling proclamations overlap with the witness protection 
proclamation on criminal informant use. This overlap, which is apparent on 
preconditions for criminal informant use and rewards available to them, creates 
considerable gaps and inconsistencies. For instance, unlike the witness 
protection proclamation, the anti- terrorism proclamation attaches no importance 
to the weight of evidence obtained from a criminal informant. Furthermore, 
while the former grants immunity to criminal informants, the latter is limited to 
sentence mitigation. There is also contradiction between the anti-corruption or 
anti-trafficking and smuggling proclamations with witness protection 
proclamation. A case in point is timeliness for criminal informant use. While the 
latter puts no time limitation for criminal informant use, both the anti-
corruption, anti-trafficking and smuggling proclamations restrict criminal 
informant use to operate only before the institution of criminal charge. 
All these and similar gaps and inconsistencies need to be resolved by 
enacting a comprehensive and coherent law on informant use or by ensuring 
consistency among the dispersed laws. Tentatively, the use of rules of 
interpretation together with the ‘inapplicable law clauses’105 inserted in the 
respective proclamations would be of some help to enforce the laws. 
Although the above proclamations have attempted to set out some standards 
for selecting and rewarding criminal informants, they are far from being clear, 
specific and complete. There are no detailed guidelines to inform and 
complement the standards. Relevant factors such as the degree of 
participation/culpability of the criminal informant, the seriousness and 
complexity of the crime (both that of the criminal informant and the defendant), 
the criminal record of the informant, the availability of other evidence, the 
reliability and completeness of the testimony/evidence obtained from the 
criminal informant, among others, are unduly overlooked. The timing 
requirement, which is not recognized across all proclamations covered in this 
article, is also fraught with circumventions. This would leave the practice 
                                           
105 A similarly worded clause is found in the proclamations under discussion: “No law, 
regulation, directive or practice shall, in so far as it is inconsistent with this Proclamation, 
be applicable with respect to matters provided for by this Proclamation.”  
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amenable to arbitrary use, if not abuse of criminal informant use. Thus, a 
comprehensive set of standards on informant selection and reward is imperative. 
The concessions and benefits envisaged are incomplete and inconsistent. 
While some of the laws such as the anti-corruption proclamation reward 
criminal informants simply with immunity excluding other concessions, the 
anti-terrorism proclamation refuses to recognize immunity. On the other hand, 
as shown under Section 3 above, the anti-corruption proclamation combines 
sentence reduction with immunity, but erroneously.  Further, with the exception 
of the anti-corruption law, the laws are ambiguous on whether pecuniary 
benefits connected to the crime can form part of the informant deal. 
In all of the proclamations examined in this article, enforceability issues 
compound criminal informant use. There is no requirement for formal 
agreement between the prosecution and the informant in all the laws. Perhaps, 
the requirement by the anti-corruption law to the effect that the Ministry of 
Justice (currently the Attorney General) issues a letter attesting the grant of 
immunity to an informant –albeit not an agreement as such–, can serve some 
evidentiary purposes. The witness protection proclamation does not require any 
formal agreement on protection of immunity. This complicates enforceability of 
informant deals; invites controversies and uncertainties on the nature, scope and 
effect of the deals, the respective obligations and entitlements of the parties, 
especially that of the criminal informant. This can breed arbitrary uses and 
abuses of the criminal informant system. 
Informant deals lack sanctions and enforceability. In practice the threat of 
prosecution (both of the underlying crime, perjury and/or misleading of justice), 
withholding of a bail bond and sometimes detention until testimony is given, are 
used as enforcement arsenals for the prosecution. Ostensibly, the criminal 
informant has no remedies with the exception of an internal administrative 
recourse, which is not reliable. These need legal intervention. 
Although the inherent unreliability and defects of criminal informant 
testimony warrants robust judicial guarantees and intervention, the 
proclamations do not clearly articulate the role of courts.  As a matter of law, the 
court needs to be mandated to review the selection of criminal informants, the 
admissibility of informant testimony, and evaluate it with extraordinary caution 
and attach a deserved weight to it. Thus, the legal requirement under the anti-
corruption and witness protection laws that demands justice institutions to treat 
informant testimony as ordinary witnesses needs revision. Moreover, the anti-
trafficking and smuggling proclamation needs intervention because it confuses 
plea bargaining proper with informant use (cooperation agreements) and 
overlooks the indispensable role of courts to review and sanction the plea 
agreement. 
The lawmaker seems reluctant to foresee the considerable menaces that 
accompany criminal informant use, which include perjury and wrongful 
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convictions, corruption and abuses, discrimination, and impunity. Such 
reluctance is evident at least in two fronts. First, the laws under consideration 
fail to provide for relevant safeguards and measures that attenuate the flaws and 
risks of the informant system. Guarantees such as protection against false 
testimony, requirement of formal informant agreement, effective review 
mechanisms, disclosure, corroboration of informant testimony, and liberal cross 
examination, are absent or scanty at best. With the exception of the anti-
corruption law, the laws also fail to assure a criminal informant that any 
evidence he provides will not be used against him. This discourages potential 
informants from coming forward and would leave those who provide evidence 
in a state of uncertainty. 
This should not, however, imply ‘absolute’ protection. One notable exception 
would be liability for perjury or misleading of justice whereby an informant may 
not validly invoke the protection. Second, the anti-corruption and witness 
protection proclamations stipulate explicit rules that seem to ignore the inherent 
unreliability of criminal informant evidence. The anti-corruption law, instead of 
setting forth reliable safeguards against the blemishes of the informant system, 
unduly treats criminal informant testimony as carrying equal weight like that of 
the testimony of ordinary witnesses. Likewise, the witness protection 
proclamation prohibits the invoking of the grant of witness protection measures 
–including immunity to criminal informants– to challenge and undermine the 
credit of such witnesses. This is antagonistic to any prudent screening of such 
inherently unreliable piece of evidence, perhaps to the detriment of accurate 
outcomes.                                                                                                           ■ 
 
 
